Introduction
Electric power is a critical component of international energy-economypromoting economic growth by consuming resources and producing potentially harmful emissions. As such, policymakers have identified the electric power sector as a key mechanism to maintain economic growth while simultaneously offsetting emissions. Political intractability for explicitly pricing carbon emissions (e.g. a carbon tax) has led to policies designed to discourage or promote specific a Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University, 475 Via Ortega, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: jcpeters@stanford.edu).
the CES specification (Sue Wing, 2006; Fujimori et al., 2014) . In doing so, this article supports and enhances electricity-detailed modeling in the CGE community.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing approaches for modeling electric power substitution both indirectly via capitalenergy and energy fuel substitution and directly via electric power substitution. The advantages and disadvantages of several power substitution representations are evaluated in general terms. Section 3 reviews key features of GTAP-E and then introduces a nested ACES electric power substitution specification into the GTAP-E model using insights from the review in Section 2, creating the GTAP-E-Power model. 2 Section 4 first compares the result resolution of GTAP-E-Power to GTAP-E by repeating a global carbon tax experiment from McDougall and Golub (2007) updated with several hard targets from the Paris Agreement. Second, GTAP-EPower is used to simulate and analyze how regional differences drive sensitivity to a renewable power subsidy. Finally, the effects of a nuclear moratorium in the United States, European Union, and Japan are simulated to demonstrate the expanded capabilities of power substitution in analyzing technology-specific regulatory policies. Each simulation highlights important insights that are inaccessible using a CGE model with an aggregate electricity sector with only capital-energy and interfuel substitution. Section 5 highlights limitations of the GTAP-E-Power model and charts a path forward for researchers to conduct their own analysis with the model. Section 6 concludes.
Review of Existing Approaches

Foundations in capital-energy and interfuel substitution
In many CGE models specific electricity generating technologies are not identified. Instead, there is an aggregate electricity sector that purchases capital, fuels, and other inputs for production. While generating technologies are not specifically identified, some substitution may still occur indirectly via interfuel substitution (e.g. coal, oil, gas) and/or capital-energy substitution (e.g. capital improvements or fuel versus non-fuel based technologies). Interfuel substitution may serve well for fuel-based technologies; however capital-energy substitution is incapable of distinguishing non-fuel-based technologies (e.g. nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, solar, geothermal power) which constitute 32% of global power generation. Rapid progress in several emerging technologies as well as specific policies designed to help them penetrate (e.g. investment tax credits) or shut them down (e.g. nuclear moratoriums) are not easily implementable in CGE models with only capital-energy and interfuel substitution, limiting the utility of these models in today's energy and environmental policy landscape.
Electric power substitution
Recognizing the limitation of aggregate electricity sector modeling, several researchers have directly incorporated substitution between electricity generating technologies in CGE models, which requires both identification of specific generating technologies in a CGE database and an economic representation of how these technologies substitute in the production of electricity. The focus of this section is on alternative representations of power substitution in CGE models.
While capital-energy and interfuel substitution are widely studied in econometric literature, econometric work lags behind in electric power substitution. With few exceptions, the representations are neither econometrically estimated nor validated against historical observations nor compared to alternatives. 3 This has resulted in a multitude of different ways to represent power substitution without clear consensus in academic literature as to what may be a preferred method or even whether a single method may be preferred over another. Therefore, the relative advantages and disadvantages of a breadth of alternative representatives are reviewed. Table 1 shows the nested production structure for electricity production in several prominent CGE models. The illustrations depict the substitution nests in the standard fashion in CGE literature. For example, Arora and Cai (2015) describe electricity as demanding 'O&M and distribution' in fixed proportion with a virtual (in italics) generation good in the first-level nest. In the second-level nest, generating technologies substitute according to a constant ratios of elasticity of substitution (CRESH) formulation, termed a "technology bundle" approach. The CRESH parameter is calibrated to estimates of capital-energy and interfuel substitution. Alternatively, Sue Wing et al. (2011) describe electricity production as a CES substitution between 'transmission & distribution' and 'electricity generation' activities in the first nest. In the second level-nest for generation, base, intermediate, and peak load substitute according to a CES formulation and in the third level nest specific technologies substitute via CES to produce each load type. As is the case for many CGE models, the CES parameter values are assumed rather than estimated, calibrated, or validated. Researcher(s) Simplified nested production structure of electricity production MIT -Joint Program (Paltsev et al. 2005, pg. 19, 37) JGCRI -Phoenix (Sue Wing, 2011, pg. 30-31) GEM-E3 (Capros et al. 2013, pg. 43, Annex VIII) GTEM/CTEM (Arora and Cai, 2015, pg. 545-547) OECD ENVLinkages (Château et al. 2014, pg. 23, 32) *The conventional fossil sector in Paltsev et al. (2005) and fossil-fuel based sector in Château et al. (2014) have capital-energy and interfuel substitution rather than substituting technologies.
Notes: This is not an exhaustive list of research efforts. Production structures are summarized based on available documentation and simplified for illustrative purposes. Some sectors may be renamed for comparability. Nesting below basic electricity sub-sectors excluded. These two examples (along with the others in Table 1 ) illustrate the wide variety of possible representations of power substitution in CGE models. None of the methods can be said to truly be preferred. Instead they can be said to be useful for particular purposes. Returning to the same two methods discussed previously, the CRESH ("technology bundle") approach of Arora and Cai (2015) is more general than CES (i.e., CES is a special case of CRESH); however, in the absence of empirical support (as currently the case in power substitution) the simpler theory (i.e. CES) may be preferred according to the principle of Occam's razor (Italianer, 1986 pg. 310) . Preference, in this case, may depend on the availability of data. Preference may also be dependent on the research question. The representation in Sue Wing (2011) , because of the base, intermediate, and peak load differentiation, can answer research questions pertaining to the load characteristics of technologies, where the other models listed in Table 1 would not be useful. In fact, many electricity researchers find load type to be an important aspect of substitutability. Table 2 contains a non-exhaustive list of basic advantages and disadvantages of each of the models reviewed in Table 1 .
Electricity
Output of perfect substitutes
There are other models not listed in Table 1 that represent electricity substitution, but merit brief mention. The Global Climate Assessment Model (GCAM) assumes no substitution between existing technologies, but uses a nested logit choice model for new installations. The logit choice model is often seen as an advantage over CES and CRESH, because it preserves additivity of GWh between inputs and total production (Fujimori et al. 2014 ). Peters and Hertel (2017) implement ACES substitution for existing technologies and a logit choice model for new installations, albeit only in a partial equilibrium model.
Further, hybrid top-down, bottom-up models or "linked" models may use a bottom-up representation of electricity (e.g. richly-detailed least cost optimization) to pass quantity information to a top-down CGE model which then passes price data back, solving iteratively (e.g. Manne and Wene, 1992; Böhringer, 1998; Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008) . These alternate representations are highly useful because of their ability to capture technological detail, capacity changes, as well as regional difference in electricity markets, policy, and regulation (Adams et al. 2014) , but are less common in CGE models and may be unfamiliar to some CGE researchers.
A path forward
It is clear that identifying an ideal method for representing electric power substitution for CGE modeling would be premature at this point in time. Rather, the researcher should select (or create) the most relevant representation for the question at hand. This point motivates the creation of a CGE model that is available to GTAP subscribers so that researchers can adjust a model with electric power substitution to their particular research problem. The following section describes how GTAP-E-Power is constructed upon the GTAP-E foundation for precisely this purpose. 
GTAP-E-Power
GTAP-E is a version of the GTAP model that includes capital-energy and interfuel substitution and is widely-used to analyze global energy and climate policy. The GTAP-E model is freely-available to subscribers to GTAP. As such, it is an ideal foundation to introduce electric power substitution to promote electricity-detailed analysis in the CGE community.
GTAP-Power is used as the initial data base. GTAP-Power is a disaggregation of the GTAP data base that splits electricity ('ely') into transmission and distribution ('TnD') as well as 11 generating technologies: nuclear, coal, gas base load, gas peak load, oil base load, oil peak load, hydro base load, hydro peak load, wind, solar, and 'other' power generating technologies. The data base is constructed by minimizing the deviation between the total value implied by levelized cost and production data for each technology such that the total value is equal to the original GTAP value for general equilibrium consistency. Peters (2016) documents GTAP-Power in its entirety. Appendix C is a step-by-step guide to create additional headers needed to fit the GTAP-Power Data Base to the GTAP-E-Power format.
In this procedure, a virtual electricity good, which is a composite of several goods, replaces the GTAP-E electricity sector. A virtual generation good, base load good, and peak good are added to the GTAP-E framework to represent substitution between the GTAP-Power technologies listed above. These virtual goods are simply aggregations of the actual produced goods in the database (e.g. nuclear, coal). The first section explains how these technologies produce the virtual electricity good, and the subsequent section explains how it fits into the GTAP-E framework.
Incorporating electric power substitution
The wide variety of alternative ways to represent electric power substitution was shown in Section 2, while Table 1 showed that there is currently no single path forward. Instead, the researcher should use a representation that is well-suited to their data and research question or one that performs well compared to historical observation. One of the major purposes of this particular work is to provide the CGE community with a tool and guidance to conduct electricity-detailed CGE modeling. Therefore, the purpose of this section is three-fold: i) provide guidance in justifying a particular representation, ii) provide guidance in constructing nested substitution in the accompanying GTAP-E-Power software, and iii) introduce the ACES formulation to electricity substitution in a GTAP model. Figure 1 shows the representation of power substitution in GTAP-E-Power which guides the discussion in the following sections. 
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution
The electricity sector is composed of generation (i.e. production), transmission, and distribution to firms and households. Transmission and distribution are similar activities in that they require similar materials to meet a similar objective (i.e. delivering generating electricity to customers). These two activities are treated as a single service sector (transmission and distribution, T&D) that is demanded in fixed proportion (Leontief) with a virtual generation good ( Figure 1 ). That is, if electricity demand increases 5%, generation must increase 5% and T&D services must increase 5%. T&D is represented in the same way as all the other firms, while generation is the final product of electric power substitution.
Base and Peak Load
A unique characteristic of the electricity sector is that supply must meet demand instantaneously. Demand can fluctuate greatly throughout the day, week, and season. Generating technologies have technical limitations that prevent them from instantaneously adjusting utilization to meet these fluctuations. For instance, coal power plants cannot adjust utilization easily in response to prevailing daily demand, resulting in the common classification as "base" load, meaning it can provide a base amount of generation during the day, but is not competitive in meeting demand spikes or "peak" demand. On the other hand, gas and oil power are able to adjust operations quickly and are competitive in meeting the peak demand. Depending on the prevailing fuel prices, these fuels may even be competitive with base load technologies (e.g. inexpensive gas in the United States
GasP, OilP, HydroP, SolarP is leading substitution to gas power). 4 This characteristic of electricity generation leads to the separation of technologies into virtual base load (BL) and peak (P) nests. NuclearBL, CoalBL, GasBL, OilBL, HydroBL, WindBL, and OtherBL substitute within the base load nest, while GasP, OilP, HydroP, and SolarP substitute within the peak load nest ( Figure 1 ). The virtual base and peak power goods are demanded in fixed proportion (Leontief). That is, the load profile of electricity demand is independent of the relative price between base and peak load.
Electricity Generating Technologies
In both the base-peak nest and within each of those nests, the units of measure are identical (i.e. GWh), and the sum of electricity demanded from each individual technology and total electricity demanded should be equal. CES substitution, as is used in many of the examples in Table 1 , does not have this additive property. Instead, GTAP-E-Power uses the ACES formulation pioneered by Dixon and Rimmer (2006) for labor and Giesecke et al. (2013) for land.
As opposed to cost minimization in CES, ACES minimizes the (dis)utility of cost. The disutility of costs can be interpreted in the electricity sector as a combination of average cost and various costs of reliability in meeting the complex nature of demand (Peters and Hertel, 2017) . In the context of electricity, the disutility reflects the fact that the average cost of generation is an incomplete representation of costs faced by the electricity system operator. In addition to generation, the operator faces the costs of day-ahead and balancing operating capacity reserves, reactive services, synchronous condensing, and black start services which focus on the reliability of supply and are a function of the technologies used to generate electricity in the system. The system operator problem for base load power is formulated as follows:
subject to:
4 Fuels are often combusted using different technologies to meet the two types of demand (e.g. steam turbine, combustion turbine, combined cycle).
where is the set of base load technologies, is the quantity of generation from technology , is the price of generation for technology , is the total generation of base load power, is the disutility of base load supply, and is a parameter. The same formulation is used for peak load technologies.
The constraint, equation (2), ensures that the ACES formulation preserves the additive property in electric power substitution, seen by many as a limitation in CES representations (Sue Wing, 2006; Fujimori et al. 2014) , without significant theoretical departure from the popular cost-minimizing CES formulation (van der Mensbrugghe and Peters, 2016). 5 Peters and Hertel (2017) use an identical power substitution representation in a partial equilibrium analysis of the United States, estimate the substitution parameters using prices and generation data from 2002-2012, and use ACES substitution parameters of 1.386 and 0.472 for base and peak load nests, respectively; these values are the default parameters for all regions in GTAP-EPower.
Integrating with the GTAP-E foundation
Both the GTAP and GTAP-E model are widely documented. 6 This section details how the power substitution described in Section 3.1 integrates with key elements of the GTAP-E model (i.e. generating technology production and firm, household, and government demands).
Production for each generating technology
One of the foremost defining features of GTAP-E is that industries are able to substitute capital and energy as well as fuels for production, as shown in Figure 2 . For instance, here, energy-intensive industries can make capital improvements to increase energy efficiency. They can also shift fuel usage (i.e. coal, oil, gas, or electricity) based on prevailing prices. The GTAP-E specification is used for all productive sectors in GTAP-E-Power, but has an important interpretation in the context of electricity generation technologies.
Generation changes are determined by utilization, expansion, and their interdependency (Peters and Hertel, 2017) . Utilization is driven by two mechanisms: dispatchability and electric power substitution. The latter is a sectorwide parameter and was explored in section 3.1. The former, dispatchability, is technology-specific and pertains to the ability of a technology to adjust utilization with existing capacity. Dispatchable technologies can substitute additional operating and fuel costs in lieu of constructing additional capital (i.e. capacity). A non-dispatchable technology cannot adjust utilization and can only expand generation by increasing capacity. Technical limitations prevent several technologies from adjusting generation given fixed capacity. For instance, Peters and Hertel (2017) show that fuel-based technologies have adjusted annual capacity factor from 2002-2012 in response to prevailing economic conditions, while other technologies like nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, and solar have not (and cannot easily from a technological point-of-view).
This concept guides the endowment-energy and capital-energy parameter values selected for each of the generating technologies. In a static model like the model described here, dispatchable technologies (i.e. CoalBL, GasBL, OilBL, GasP, OilP and OtherBL) have non-zero CES parameter values in both the endowmentenergy and capital-energy nest. The endowment-energy nest represents the ability to substitute labor for capital. Dispatchable technologies can increase production by increasing labor (e.g. more production equates to longer hours and overtime). Therefore, the default endowment-energy CES parameters for dispatchable technologies are set to the same parameter for energy-intensive industries. Similarly, greater dispatchability of a technology corresponds with greater capitalenergy substitution. The default capital-energy CES parameter for GTAP-E-Power is set to 1.0 for gas-and oil-fired power, 0.5 for CoalBL, and 0.1 for OtherBL to reflect relative dispatchability of these technologies. Non-dispatchable technologies (i.e. NuclearBL, HydroBL, WindBL, HydroP, and SolarP) have zero values in the endowment-energy nest and do not have significant energy demand which means, absent changes in capital productivity, capital is demanded in fixed proportion to demand. That is, the only changes in generation for nondispatchable technologies must be driven by capacity retirements or expansion.
Firm demand
One of the novelties of the GTAP-Power Data Base is that firms demand individual technologies as opposed to an aggregate national electricity good. The purpose is to allow for certain firms (e.g. manufacturing) to demand more base load type technologies, consistent with 24 hour production, and allow others (e.g. services) to demand more peak load type ones, say during business hours. The current version of the GTAP-Power Data Base (accompanying the GTAP 9 Data Base) assumes that firms demand equal shares of each technology, because of the lack of reasonable data internationally, but it is the more flexible and general method. GTAP-E-Power is capable of leveraging this aspect of the GTAP-Power Data Base, but at the expense on computation complexity and time.
All firms demand electricity in the manner described in Figure 1 . Because in the GTAP-Power Data Base that accompanies the GTAP 9 Data Base, firms demand equal shares of each technology, the results would be identical to the more commonly-implemented case where firms are assumed to demand an aggregate electricity good with generating technologies as activities.
Household and government demands
Similar to firms, households and governments may demand specific technologies. For example, some electricity providers in the United States offer options to customers to purchase renewable electricity. Also, household solar is a rapidly growing industry in the United States.
Also, similar to firm demand, household and government demands for electricity are in the same share as production and the nested demand structure is identical to production. However, the GTAP-E-Power offers a starting point to alter this assumption.
Simulations with GTAP-E-Power
GTAP-E-Power leverages the disaggregated electricity sector data from the GTAP-Power Data Base with the electric power substitution described above. This section describes three simulations which demonstrate the usefulness of GTAP-EPower via: i) expanded clarity in power sector results compared to GTAP-E and ii) further capabilities in electricity-detailed CGE modeling. First, a 16 sector, 20 sector, 8 factor aggregation of the GTAP-Power Data Base is implemented in the GTAP-E-Power model and compared to the equivalent GTAP-E construction (i.e. one without specific generating technologies and power substitution). 7 Next, the GTAP-E-Power model is used to test the efficacy of renewable subsidies around the world as well as the impact of nuclear moratoriums in several countries; both of these simulations are not feasible with CGE models with only capital-energy and interfuel substitution. These three simulations highlight the expanded research possibilities unleashed by introducing electric power substitution in CGE modeling. The simulations also highlight some pitfalls and peculiarities of electricity modeling using CGE that should be addressed for some research purposes. 8 Burniaux and Truong (2002) and McDougall and Golub (2007) use GTAP-E to simulate carbon permit trading to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets. Similarly, the simulation in this section replaces countries' Kyoto Protocol carbon dioxide reduction targets with the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) pledged to meet the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016). Only countries and regions with specific reduction targets are considered in this analysis ( Table  3 ). Countries that did not pledge a specific target (e.g. India and China pledged reduction in carbon intensity, South Africa pledged to plateau then decline) as well as ad hoc groupings of countries with a smattering of targets (e.g. 'MENA', 'RoW') are assumed not to have any reduction target for this particular simulation. The targets, converted to reductions from 2011 levels (the base year for the GTAPPower Data Base) and shown in the right column of Table 3 , are used as shocks to simulate pledged proportional emission reductions in 2011 via the CO2 quota mechanism in the GTAP-E and the GTAP-E-Power model -which simulates a cap-and-trade system. These countries comprise only 44.8% of 2011 global CO2 emissions; including a target for India and China would cover 75.5% (EIA, 2016) .
Expanded electricity result resolution
The purpose of this simulation is to show that GTAP-E-Power provides expanded result resolution in simulations that have previously been explored using GTAP-E. GTAP-E-Power has all the basic modeling capabilities of GTAP-E. The departure in the two models is power substitution in the GTAP-E-Power model. The main result, shown in Table 4 , is the effective cost per ton of CO2 in the no permit trade and world trade scenarios. The cost of CO2 is inversely related to the power substitution possibility. That is, as the elasticities of substitution increase, the cost per ton of CO2 decreases, echoing the need for properly estimated, calibrated, and/or validated elasticities. The Paris Agreement shocks in Table 3 are imposed on the GTAP-E and GTAP-E-Power models. Table 4 compares the marginal cost of achieving the Paris Agreement based on the INDCs with no inter-sector or inter-region permit trading and with worldwide permit trading.
One interesting result is the difficulty, measured by a high CO2 cost, the European Union may face meeting their aggressive Paris Agreement target without permit trading, $204 per ton CO2. While some of the difficulty can be attributed to the aggressive target, it may also be due to less opportunity to shift away from high-emitting coal power. Coal comprises only 25% of total generation in the European Union, whereas it is over 40% higher in the United States.
From another perspective, when world trade of carbon permits is allowed, China, India, and South Africa reduce emissions greatly because their coalintensive electricity sector offers greater opportunity to reduce emissions.
Also, both the GTAP-E and GTAP-E-Power results show that allowing trading of carbon permits will reduce the cost of CO2 for every country with a quota and provides opportunity for non-quota countries to reduce emissions rather than increase, as in the no permit trading case. The results in Table 4 show that the ACES parameter values used in GTAP-EPower happen to produce roughly similar results as GTAP-E. The marginal costs of meeting the Paris Agreement targets is slightly lower in GTAP-E-Power, which suggests that introducing power substitution makes the electricity slightly more flexible than with only capital-energy and interfuel substitution. However, it is important to note that these parameter values (contained in the default GTAP-EPower parameters files, default.prm and wtr_p.prm) are adopted from Peters and Hertel (2017) where they are calibrated and validated for the United States, but not for other regions. Specification, parameterization, and calibration should be driven by a specific research questions, and these steps remain the responsibility of the individual researcher. Sources: GTAP-E versions GTAPE9 and GTAP-E-Power version EPOWER9; experiment: notr; results: qf(i,"ely",r) and qo(i,r).
While Table 4 shows that GTAP-E-Power encompasses the modeling capabilities of GTAP-E, Figure 3 shows that GTAP-E-Power enhances electricitydetail compared to GTAP-E.
Comparing the electricity generation results of GTAP-E-Power to GTAP-E reveals two key points. First, GTAP-E-Power offers greater result resolution in the evolution of the electricity sector. Recall that GTAP-E has interfuel substitution via coal, oil, and gas inputs to electricity and capital-energy substitution for the electricity sector as a whole. Therefore, we cannot see precisely which technologies play a role in the non-fuel base technologies that are broadly lumped within the capital sector.
Second, most of the substitution in GTAP-E occurs between coal-and gas-fired power rather than between fossil fuels and renewables (represented implicitly through energy-capital substitution). This may be because capital-energy substitution in GTAP-E was meant to represent efficiency gains rather than introduction of renewable technologies. 9 GTAP-E-Power, however, projects both coal to gas power substitution as well as the emergence of renewable substitutes. The greater flexibility also reduces the effect on total electricity price and the electricity sector contracts less (-11.2%) than in GTAP-E (-12.4%).
These two points reiterate the importance of specifying, calibrating, and validating the GTAP-E-Power in order to explore these results in greater depth.
Expanded electricity capabilities
Differential policy impacts due to region-specific attributes
As environmental policy has shifted focus from global taxation to more politically-tractable subsidies and regulation for specific sources, the electricity sector has been identified as one of those key sources. For instance, the United States, various European, and other countries offer production and investment tax credits for renewable generating technologies. The magnitude and scale of these interventions vary widely by region. Further, one method for reducing global emissions would be for developed countries to invest in renewable power technologies in developing countries, where they are otherwise cost prohibitive. Several developing countries' INDCs acknowledge that reducing emissions at high levels is contingent on the help from the international community. This simulation asks in which regions would a "solar and wind" subsidy make the most impact on local emissions.
A 50% output subsidy is implemented for each region separately, and the percentage change in regional CO2 emissions and the impact on GDP are shown in Figure 4 . 10 Leakage is not reported in that the emission results only consider the region where the subsidy is implemented rather than global emissions. Figure 4 shows a large difference in the emissions elasticity of GDP (i.e. the ratio of percentage change in regional CO2 emissions and percentage change in GDP) in response to the wind and solar subsidy. The United States has an emissions elasticity of GDP of 51.4 while Japan has an elasticity of only 2.1. The larger elasticity implies that the policy could potentially generate larger emission reductions per percentage of GDP and would be considered a more effective policy measure compared to regions with lower elasticities. Table 5 shows these elasticities as well as the nominal cost to GDP (in USD) per ton of CO2 eliminated from production for each region and the regional attributes that drive the efficacy of wind and solar subsidies. The nominal GDP cost of emission reduction is the absolute measure of the CO2 elasticity of GDP. The elasticity is driven by both the numerator, which measures the ability for solar and wind to displace high-emitting power sources, especially coal, and the denominator which measures the effect of the subsidies on GDP. 10 CA, RUS, MENA, EXLA, EXAs, NGA, ZAF, and RoW have smaller shares of wind and solar and are dropped from the results presented here. Sources: GTAP-Power and GTAP-E-Power version EPower9; exp: renewsubs; results: gco2t and qgdp. Author's calculations.
The numerator (the blue bar in Figure 4 ) will be greater when wind and solar are competitive in the initial equilibrium, and there is sufficient fossil fuel (especially coal) power to replace. Table 5 shows that this the case. High shares of wind and solar combined with high shares of fossil fuels (especially coal) correlate with the large CO2 reductions in China, India, the United States, the European Union, and Australia & New Zealand in Figure 4 . Note that, despite the highest share of wind and solar, the emission reduction opportunities in the European Union are offset by less fossil fuel power to replace. Similarly, Canada has the fewest existing fossil fuel plants of the regions shown here, and the effect on total emissions from the subsidy is low. The emission impact is low in XE and Japan because of the low existing shares of wind and solar.
Switching focus to the denominator, the elasticity will be higher when the subsidy will have a smaller impact on the rest of the economy. The wind and solar subsidy is effectively a subsidy on electricity where the effective electricity subsidy is larger where wind and solar constitute a large share (i.e. more of the subsidy is passed on to the electricity price). Therefore, although the calculation of GDP is complex, one indicator of GDP sensitivity is the size of electricity-intensive sectors in the region. Regions with large shares of wind and solar as well as dominant electricity-intensive sectors would raise the impact of the policy interventiondecreasing allocative efficiency and reducing GDP. Figure 4 shows that GDP decreases the most in the European Union, India, and Australia & New Zealand. The impact on GDP is less in other regions where the share of wind and solar, and therefore effective subsidy on electricity, are low (i.e. China, XE, Canada, and Japan) or where electricity-intensive sector constitute a smaller share of total regional output (i.e. the United States).
The regional efficacy of the solar and wind subsidy is dependent on the technological mix of electricity generation as well as the electricity-intensity of the economy. This analysis shows that Japan, the European Union, Canada, and Australia & New Zealand may have a greater opportunity for investing in wind and solar in developing countries compared to their own region. Extrapolated outside this analysis, the best destinations for investing in these renewable technologies would be in coal power reliant countries like China and India where these renewables will be competitive (e.g. high quality solar or wind resources). Further, that strategy may not be effective for some developed countries like the United States where subsidies may actually be more effective at reducing emissions at home.
Global impacts of regional policy: nuclear moratoriums
The previous simulation focused on technology-specific fiscal policy, but technology-specific regulations are also becoming increasingly prevalent. One such regulation is nuclear moratorium and phase-out which aims to halt new construction and phase-out old nuclear plants, respectively. This simulation explores the CO2 emission cost as well as cost to regional household utility of a nuclear moratorium in the United States, European Union, and Japan in meeting the Paris Agreement targets.
European countries (e.g. France) view nuclear power as a critical technology in their electricity mix; however, several other European Union and interior (EUx) countries have already implemented a nuclear moratorium and/or phase-out (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland). These selective moratoriums may prevent expansion in nuclear power in the region as a whole. Across the Atlantic, a strong anti-nuclear movement and additional state regulation along with inexpensive natural gas has stifled expansion in nuclear power, despite no explicit state or national moratoriums. Moving across the Pacific, in response to the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011 Japan shut down all of its nuclear power, but has since lifted the shut down with the plan to decrease the generation share of nuclear power from 30% to 20%. To reflect these regulations in GTAP-E-Power, the production of electricity from nuclear power (NuclearBL) is not permitted to change from 2011 levels in the United States, European Union, and Japan -i.e., NuclearBL output is treated exogenously, replaced by an endogenous output tax in these regions to ensure this condition is held, similar to a quota. This assumption breaks the strict requirements of a general equilibrium result (i.e. quantities are no longer completely endogenous), but shows how these increasing prevalent technology-specific regulations can be analyzed in GTAP-E-Power and other global economics models.
Imposing the nuclear moratoriums in GTAP-E-Power should make it more difficult for the affected regions to meet their Paris Agreement target by eliminating a low-emitting generating technological option. The cost of carbon should increase in the moratorium regions and the household utility should decline from the deadweight loss of the effective tax needed to ensure no expansion. Table 6 shows the impact of the nuclear moratoriums in terms of nuclear output, emissions, carbon cost, and household utility for each region. Notes: Nuclear power moratorium shocks for USA, EUx, and JPN and emission targets are shown in bold. CA, MENA, EXLA, and ZAF have modest amounts of nuclear power. ANZ, EXAs, and NGA have no nuclear power. Table 6 supports the initial hypothesis. The moratorium on nuclear power in the United States, European Union, and Japan increases the negative impact of the Paris Agreement on utility in the countries. This is primarily because the technology is eliminated as an option to shift away from fossil fuels. In fact, the moratorium affected countries' depressed economies extend the negative impact to other countries as well. On the positive side, the effect of the moratoriums on the cost of CO2 is small relative to effect from the Paris Agreement targets themselves (less than 5% of the contribution to total cost in most regions). This lends some creditability to the viewpoint that the risks of nuclear power may outweigh the benefits, measured here as a cost. However, these costs would increase if nuclear power was removed completely from the mix rather just halting new construction, as simulated here.
Next, the same moratoriums are explored with carbon permit trading. Carbon permit trading should allow for moratorium-affected regions to offset the cost buying permits from countries that do not have a moratorium and can expand all low-emitting technologies more freely. Notes: Nuclear power moratorium shocks for USA, EUx, and JPN are shown in bold. CA, MENA, EXLA, and ZAF have modest amounts of nuclear power. ANZ, EXAs, and NGA have no nuclear power. Table 7 shows that allowing worldwide trade of carbon permits helps offset much of the cost of the nuclear moratoriums in the United States, European Union and Japan. The European Union and Japan are still hurt by the policy, but by a smaller amount. The United States is roughly unaffected. Interestingly the rest of Europe (XE) is still hurt, presumably from the deeper economic connections to the European Union and lack of energy exports to gain from the higher cost of CO2.
The trade of carbon permits helps reduce the impact of these region-specific policies. The cost of CO2 only increases $0.09 from $10.23 to $10.32 per ton of CO2. This raises the cost of carbon across all countries and benefits the more flexible electricity sectors (i.e. those countries without similar moratoriums).
GTAP-E-Power expands the result resolution of models that only have capitalenergy and interfuel substitution. Previously represented as capital inputs to electricity in GTAP-E, changes in nuclear, hydroelectric, wind, and solar power are easily analyzed. Technology-specific progress and policies, such as renewable subsidies and nuclear moratoriums shown in this section, can be simulated in a straightforward manner. The electricity sector detail in GTAP-E-Power is a powerful tool; however, additional detail requires additional care in designing the experiments and interpreting the results.
Known limitations
The detailed representation of electric power substitution in GTAP-E-Power merits discussion about several limitations in modeling key aspects of the electricity sector. None of these limitations are exclusive to GTAP-E-Power, but rather apply to electricity-detailed CGE modeling in general.
First, in GTAP-E-Power transmission and distribution is demanded in fixed proportion with total generation. However, technologies have different locational constraints that affect the cost allocation between transmission and generation. For example, utility-scale solar is often deployed on inexpensive land far from the demand. Steam turbines, on the other hand, must have inexpensive access to water. GTAP-E-Power may not be able to address the full range of questions related to transmission and distribution.
Second, the specification of electric power substitution discussed in Section 3.1 uses previously calibrate parameters, but is not validated in a robust manner that helps lend confidence in the reliably of the numerical results. That is, the model provides a platform for studying electricity relevant policy using a GTAP-based model, but specification, parameterization, and calibration should be driven by a specific research questions and therefore, remains the responsibility of the individual researcher.
Third, the single substitution mechanism -i.e. nested substitution in generation terms -may not adequately represent the realities of the electricity sector. Peters and Hertel (2017) suggest that the simplistic CES and ACES specifications used here, and in many other studies, do not differentiate the two distinct mechanisms for adjusting electricity generation: short-run capacity utilization and longer-run expansion. A single elasticity of substitution may confuse short-and long-run scenarios, because that elasticity may increase with the time period of the analysis. In the short-run, substitution is limited by existing capacity (no capital expansion); however, moving to the long-run equilibrium as capacity is replaced, only operational considerations (e.g. base versus peak load) constrain perfect substitution. Therefore, the elasticity of substitutions chosen in the GTAP-E-Power specification should be a function of the simulation time horizon.
Along a similar vein, GTAP-E-Power is a static model and cannot straightforwardly map out trajectories, an increasingly common capability of IAMs which can help address "invest now" versus "invest later" renewable energy strategies. Introducing dynamics that track capital accumulation in electric power can differentiate lumpy, long-term capacity and short-run capacity utilization changes. However, in practice, capital does not map precisely to capacity in dynamic CGE models of electric power, and the models are calibrated to generation changes rather than to capacity utilization and expansion mechanisms that are described above. Also, incorporating dual substitution mechanisms or dynamics both require additional data and limiting assumptions. Still, the lack of dual mechanisms for generation changes and dynamics are major limitations of the GTAP-E-Power model.
Conclusions
GTAP-E-Power leverages the GTAP-E-Power Data Base in the commonly used GTAP-E model. Electric power substitution between base and peak load generating technologies combined with transmission and distribution allows CGE modelers to explore the role of electric power in the global economy. The basepeak separation and the implementation of the ACES specification overcome key limitations of other static electricity-detailed CGE models.
Electric power substitution allows for greater resolution and clarity of the response of capital-intensive generating technologies to policy and technology shocks. Further, increasingly common technology-specific policy and uneven productivity advances are easily studied in the GTAP-E-Power model.
The GTAP-E-Power model is a versatile tool for electricity-detailed CGE modeling that can add necessary resolution to global policy analysis. The representation of electric power substitution can be calibrated with existing global electricity generation data and does not require strong assumptions that are required by more complex representations or dynamic CGE models. The next step of research is to capture the dual mechanisms of generation change (i.e. capacity and utilization) in the GTAP framework; however, this requires data that is yet to be identified.
Combined with qualitative electricity expertise, the GTAP-E-Power model supports quantitative global economic analysis of electric power policy and technology. Appendix C details a list of steps to produce an alternate aggregation of the GTAP-E-Power model.
